


























CARF is presently supported by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.,  Citigroup,  Dai-ichi 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company, Nippon Life Insurance 
Company, Nomura Holdings, Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (in alphabetical 
















Working Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form.  They are not intended for 
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author.  For that reason Working Papers may 
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. 
   
CARF-F-224 
 
Why Did “Zombie” Firms Recover in Japan? 
 
Shin-ichi Fukuda 
University of Tokyo 
Jun-ichi Nakamura 
Development Bank of Japan   
 
 
July 2010 1 
 
Why Did “Zombie” Firms Recover in Japan? 
 
Shin-ichi Fukuda (University of Tokyo)
 *, 




The Japanese economy experienced prolonged recessions during the 1990s.   
Previous studies suggest that evergreen lending to troubled firms known as “zombie 
firms” distorted market discipline in terms of stabilizing the Japanese economy and 
caused significant delays in the economy’s recovery.  However, the eventual 
bankruptcy of zombies was rare.  In fact, a majority of the “zombie” firms 
substantially recovered during the first half of the 2000s.    The purpose of this paper is 
to investigate why zombie firms recovered in Japan.  We first extend the method of 
Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) and identify zombies from among the listed 
firms.  Subsequently, we investigate the nature of corporate restructuring that was 
effective in reviving zombie firms.  Our multinomial logistic regressions suggest that 
reducing the employee strength of zombie firms and selling its fixed assets were 
beneficial in facilitating their recovery.  However, corporate restructuring without 
accounting transparency or by discouraging incentives for managers was ineffective.  
In addition, corporate restructuring lacked effectiveness in the absence of favorable 
macroeconomic environment as well as substantial external financial support. 
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1. Introduction 
The Japanese economy experienced prolonged recessions during the 1990s.  The 
negative shocks dramatically impaired collateral values as a result of which a number of 
Japanese banks were unable to adjust to the shocks.  However, some of the banks 
continued to provide credit to troubled borrowers known as zombie firms.  Previous 
studies including Peek and Rosengren (2005) and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap 
(2008) suggested that evergreen lending to zombie firms distorted market discipline in 
terms of stabilizing the Japanese economy and caused significant delays in the 
economy’s recovery.
1  Under “soft budget constraints,” the troubled Japanese banks 
were incentivized for supplying credit to weak firms, a number of which were already 
insolvent (see, for example, Berglöf and Roland [1995] and Dewatripont and Maskin 
[1995]).  Under these circumstances, an appropriate prescription would have been to 
dissolve these insolvent firms.   
It is plausible that banks continued to provide loans to socially inefficient zombie 
firms and that several inefficient firms continued to remain afloat owing to the 
evergreen lending.  However, the eventual bankruptcy of the zombie firms was rare.  
In fact, a majority of the zombie firms recovered substantially during the first half of the 
                                                 
1  In addition, see Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita (2003), Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003), 
and Ahearne and Shinada (2004). 3 
 
2000s.  As Figure 1 indicates, the Japanese economy had recovered from the 
prolonged recessions during the first half of the 2000s and recorded sustained growth 
until summer in 2008.
2  If the troubled firms were of no social value, their eventual 
bankruptcy would have been inevitable. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate why zombie firms recovered in Japan.    In 
the paper, we first extended the method of Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008) and 
identified zombies from among the listed firms.  Subsequently, we investigated the 
nature of corporate restructuring that was effective in reviving the zombie firms and 
moving them into the “non-zombie” category.  Our multinomial logistic regressions 
suggest that reducing the employee strength in zombie firms and selling its fixed assets 
facilitated their recovery.  One of the main driving forces for the recovery of the 
zombie firms was the tremendous structural changes during and after the financial crisis. 
However, corporate restructuring without accounting transparency or by discouraging 
incentive for managers was ineffective.  In addition, we find that corporate 
restructuring was less effective in the absence of a favorable macroeconomic 
environment as well as external financial supports.  The results imply that we require 
                                                 
2  Following autumn in 2008, the Japanese economy collapsed into unprecedented 
recession owing to the global financial crisis.    However, this is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 4 
 
additional preconditions for corporate restructuring in order to revive troubled firms 
after the crisis. 
In previous studies, Fukuda and Koibuchi (2006) indicated that under the Japanese 
banking crisis, “shock therapy” was effective in improving performance of large firms.  
In contrast, Fukuda and Koibuchi (2007) suggested that the “shock therapy” was less 
effective in improving performance of small and medium firms that were vulnerable to 
negative external shocks.  Our results are consistent with theirs in terms of the 
emphasis on substantial and swift corporate restructuring for the recovery of troubled 
firms.    However, since “shock therapy” is accompanied by considerable special losses, 
favorable macroeconomic environment, as well as substantial financial support is 
indispensable for making corporate restructuring effective. 
The paper is organized in the following manner.  Section 2 identifies zombies from 
among the listed firms.  Section 3 explains our multinomial models for exploring the 
nature of corporate restructuring that was effective in reviving zombie firms.    Section 4 
presents the descriptive statistics of explanatory variables.  Section 5 reports the 
baseline estimation results.  Section 6 indicates estimation results for two sub-sample 
periods, and Section 7 reports the effects of corporate restructuring on the profits of 
healthy firms.    Section 8 summarizes our main results and discusses their implications. 
 5 
 
2. How to identify zombie firms? 
2.1. Methodology 
In order to investigate why zombie firms recovered, it is critical to first identify those 
firms that can be categorized as zombies.  Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), 
hereafter CHK, defined zombies as those firms whose interest payments were lower 
than the hypothetical risk free interest payments.
3    The basic idea is that troubled firms 
must have received substantial interest relief; therefore, their interest payments must 
have been lower than those of healthy firms.    The attractive feature of CHK’s criterion 
is that it identifies zombies based on a simple criterion.  However, it is also a noisy 
measure of zombies, where both type one and two errors are noteworthy. 
First, the CHK criterion may identify rather healthy firms as zombies.  CHK used 
                                                 
3  The CHK’s criterion defined the hypothetical risk free interest payment “R*i,t” in the 
following manner: 
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where BS i,t, BLi,t and Bonds i,t are short-term (less than one year) bank loans, long-term 
(over one year) bank loans, and total bonds outstanding (including convertible and 
warrant-attached bonds) of firm i at the end of year t, respectively. The interest rates rs t 
and rl t   are the average short-term and long-term prime rate for year t, respectively and 
rcb5years, t is the minimum observed rate on any convertible corporate bond issued over 
the previous five years prior to t. 6 
 
prime lending rates as risk free rates in order to identify zombies.  However, we 
observed a number of healthy firms whose interest rates were lower than the prime 
lending rates.    This was particularly true in the 2000s when the Japanese economy had 
steadily recovered under the quantitative easing monetary policy. 
Second, it may not identify unhealthy firms as zombies.  Banks permitted interest 
relief to a number of their troubled borrowers.  Whenever borrowers were in serious 
financial trouble, the banks would grant debt relief in order to keep them afloat.  In 
particular, during the banking crisis in Japan, troubled banks increased evergreen 
lending to their troubled borrowers in order to conceal the actual value of their 
non-performing loans.    This evergreen lending permitted rather unhealthy firms to pay 
their interest at rates prevailing in the market without any concession. 
In order to avoid the type one and two errors, we introduced additional criteria for 
defining zombies.  First is the “profitability criterion,” where those firms whose 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) exceeded the hypothetical risk free interest 
payments were excluded from being categorized as zombies.
4  Pre-tax profits after 
deducting non-operating income should never be negative for healthy firms.    Therefore, 
                                                 
4  Since interest payments are smaller than the hypothetical risk free interest payments 
under CHK’s criterion, only those firms that had positive pre-tax profits were excluded 
from being categorized as “zombies” under the profitability criterion. 7 
 
excluding such profitable firms from being categorized as zombies reduced the 
likelihood of CHK’s criterion identifying healthy firms as zombies. 
The other criterion is the “evergreen lending criterion,” where those firms that were 
unprofitable and highly leveraged and had increased their external borrowings were 
categorized as zombies.  Those firms whose EBIT was less than the hypothetical risk 
free interest payments in period t, total external debt was over half of their total assets
5 
in period t-1, and borrowings increased in period t were categorized as zombies in the 
period t.  The firms with negative pre-tax profits and large external debt are rather 
unlikely to take a fresh loan.  Therefore, by categorizing such firms as zombies, it is 
less likely that CHK’s criterion would misidentify unhealthy firms as non-zombies. 
 
2.2. Basic characteristics of zombie firms 
Similar to the sample universe provided by CHK, the firms that are listed in the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), excluding those on TSE Mothers (market of the 
high-growth and emerging stocks), constitute the sample for this study.  The sample 
period ranges from 1995 to 2004.    We collected the firm-level financial data from The 
Corporate Financial Databank, compiled by the Development Bank of Japan.  We 
                                                 
5  Throughout this paper, the total asset value refers to its book value except for land, 
which is considered at market value. 8 
 
identified zombies on the basis of the modified CHK’s criterion in various industries 
including manufacturing, construction, real estate, retail, wholesale (excluding nine 
general trading companies), and service industries. 
  Figure 2 depicts the manner in which the share of zombie firms increased from 1995 
to 2004 among the sampled firms.    It indicates the zombie ratio calculated on the basis 
of our modified criterion as well as the original CHK’s criterion.
6  For comparison, it 
also indicates the non-performing loan ratios for banks’ during the same period.    From 
1995 to 2001, the two categories of zombie ratios exhibited similar features, although 
the zombie ratio calculated on the basis of our modified criterion was always smaller 
than that calculated on the basis of the CHK’s criterion.  Regardless of the criterion, 
the zombie ratio increased substantially in the late 1990s under the economic conditions 
of prolonged recessions and banking crisis.   
However, from 2002 to 2004, the two categories of zombie ratios exhibited rather 
different features.  The zombie ratio calculated on the basis of our modified criterion 
declined substantially after 2002.  This corresponds to the decline in the 
non-performing loan ratios during the same period.  However, the zombie ratio 
                                                 
6  The calculated "zombie" ratio based on the CHK’s criterion may not replicate the 
original series since we used a different data source and our calculation was based on 
the fiscal year. 9 
 
continued to increase when calculated on the basis of the CHK’s criterion.  It is likely 
that the original CHK’s criterion overestimated the number of zombies in the first half 
of the 2000s because it identified healthy firms as zombies under the quantitative easing 
monetary policy. 
 
3.    Multinomial logistic regression 
  The main purpose of this paper is to investigate why the number of zombies declined 
after the prolonged recessions in Japan.    In order to answer this question, we estimated 
a multinomial logistic model for exploring which corporate restructuring was effective 
in reviving zombies and moving them into the non-zombie category.  The sampled 
firms in period t are the firms that were classified as zombies in period t-1 on the basis 
of our criterion.  The data is unbalanced panel data from 1995 to 2004.  While 
estimating the multinomial logistic model on the basis of the panel data, we use the 
current status of the sampled firms as the dependent variable.  The firms in period t 
were coded as one if they continued to be categorized as zombie firms, and as two if 
they moved to the non-zombie category.  In case the firms were delisted during the 
period t, they were coded as three in period t.  Since exploring the determinants of 
delisting firms is beyond the scope of this paper, the following analysis focuses on the 10 
 
differences between the firms that were coded as one and two. 
7 
Our explanatory variables comprise three categories of financial variables and several 
auxiliary variables.  The first category of financial variables comprise of those 
variables that may measure the degree of restructuring of zombie firms such as “the 
change in employee strength”, “change in value of fixed assets”, and “no bonus 
payment dummy for executives.”  “The change in employee strength” and “change in 
value of fixed assets” are computed on the basis of the logged time difference in the 
variables.  The “no bonus payment dummy” assumed the value of one when firms 
failed to pay bonus to their executives despite reporting a positive profit and zero 
otherwise.  Dismissing employees, selling fixed assets, and curtailing bonus payments 
to executives were the typical restructuring schemes that were adopted by troubled 
Japanese firms.  Depending on the effectiveness of the schemes, we expect 
significantly negative signs for the first two variables and significantly positive sign for 
the third variable.   
The second category of financial variables is “special losses” and “special profits,”
8 
which are normalized by the total sales.  The Japanese accounting system regards 
                                                 
7  See, for example, Fukuda, Kasuya, and Akashi (2009) for the determinants of 
bankruptcy of Japanese firms. 
8  Since we employed debt relief as another explanatory variable, gross income from 
debt relief was subtracted from special profits. 11 
 
non-operational losses as special losses and non-operational income as special profits 
whenever a firm realized its unrealized capital losses and gains, respectively.  Owing 
to prolonged recessions, troubled firms had concealed the true extent of their financial 
problems in order to reduce the reported value of losses on their books or inflate their 
reported capital.  Therefore, the market participants were suspicious of the reported 
valuation of the firms.   Under the circumstances, an increase in special losses was not 
necessarily distressing news for stakeholders because it merely revealed the firm’s 
previously concealed losses to the public.  In contrast, an increase in special profits 
was not necessarily pleasant news because the temporary increase in liquidity may 
permit the firm to continue concealing their real issues.  To the extent that these 
signaling effects were important, significantly positive and negative signs were 
expected for special losses and profits, respectively. 
The third category of variables is the financial variables that are related to a firm’s 
external debt and equity.  The variables used in this category were “debt-asset ratio,” 
“accumulated debt relief,” and “capital reduction dummy.”  The debt-asset ratio is the 
total value of outstanding external debt normalized by the value of total assets.  Firms 
with larger external debt are more difficult to  restructure.  Therefore, we may expect a 
significantly negative sign for the debt-asset ratio.  In contrast, both debt relief and 
capital reduction are financial supports provided by existing stakeholders.  The 12 
 
“accumulated debt relief” is the sum of forgiven debt ratios for the previous three 
consecutive years.    The forgiven debt ratio for each period is the value of forgiven debt 
divided by the total value of outstanding debt during the previous year.  The “capital 
reduction dummy” assumes the value of one if a firm undergoes capital reduction 
during the period t and zero otherwise.  To the extent that the external financial 
supports facilitate the restructuring process, we may expect a significantly positive sign 
for both debt relief and capital reduction.  In order to permit non-linear effects, we 
include a quadratic term of “accumulated debt relief” as an additional explanatory 
variable. 
In addition to the abovementioned three categories of financial variables, we include 
the following four auxiliary variables: “The length of being a zombie,” “the change 
(logged time difference) in total sales,” “dummy of exporting manufacturing,” and 
“year dummies.”  “The length of being a zombie” denotes the number of years that a 
firm continued to be a zombie.    The recovery of firms that have experienced extended 
periods of financial trouble is rather challenging.  Therefore, we may expect a 
significantly negative sign for “the length of being a zombie.”  The other three 
auxiliary variables have been included in order to account for Japan’s external 
macroeconomic environment.  The “dummy of export manufacturing” assumes the 
value of one if the firm belongs to any one of the nine manufacturing industries (textiles, 13 
 
chemicals, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, electric equipment, 
automobiles and auto parts, other transportation equipment, precision instruments) and 
zero otherwise.    Following prolonged recessions, the Japanese economy had recovered 
from the crisis in the first half of the 2000s.  The improved macroeconomic 
environment was one of the main driving forces for the economy’s recovery.  In 
particular, Japanese exports experienced considerable growth, which supported the 
recovery of the Japanese economy from the demand side.  The remaining three 
auxiliary variables may capture these effects in the regression. 
 
4.    Elimination of outliers and descriptive statistics   
In the following analysis, those observations whose employee strength, total value of 
fixed assets, or the total sales volume increased by over 900% in a year, or whose 
special losses or profits divided by total sales exceeded 10, or whose total sales declined 
by over 90% in a year were eliminated as outliers.  In addition, we excluded those 
observations that had merged with any other listed firms or those who experienced 
surveillance by the Tokyo Stock Exchange owing to a merger with an unlisted company 
from our sample.  Excluding the outliers permits us to avoid discontinuity in time 
series as a result of mergers and acquisitions and any other kind of fundamental change 
in operation like becoming a holding company. 14 
 
Table 1 presents the average, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum of each 
financial variable for all zombie firms after eliminating the outliers.  In order to 
facilitate comparison, it also reports the corresponding statistics for all non-zombie 
firms included in our sample universe.    The table indicates that corporate restructuring 
was more conspicuous for the zombie firms as compared to non-zombie firms.  For 
example, on an average, there was a greater reduction in the employee strength for the 
zombie firms as compared to non-zombie firms.  On an average, the change in the 
value of fixed assets was positive for both the zombie and non-zombie firms; however, 
it was approximately zero for the zombie firms.    The median was negative only for the 
zombie firms.    In addition, the zombie firms faced more serious financial problems and 
less favorable external environment as compared to non-zombie firms.  The special 
losses and profits as well as debt-asset ratio were larger for the zombie firms as 
compared to non-zombie firms on both average and median.  The change in the total 
sales was positive for the non-zombie firms but negative for zombie firms on both 
average and median.   
Table 2 compares the basic statistics of two categories of zombie firms including 
those firms that continued to be categorized as zombies and those that recovered.    The 
comparison directly corresponds to the logistic regression results in the subsequent 
section.  The table indicates that both categories of zombie firms carried out some 15 
 
corporate restructuring.  However, the degree of corporate restructuring was more 
conspicuous for those firms that had recovered as compared to those that continued to 
be categorized as zombies.  For example, the decrease in the employee strength and 
value of fixed assets was more conspicuous for those firms that had recovered.    Special 
losses normalized by total sales were significantly higher for the firms that had 
recovered.  In contrast, special profits normalized by total sales were higher for those 
firms that continued to be categorized as zombies, even though the difference is 
statistically insignificant.  The different degrees and directions of restructuring may 
have affected the status of the troubled firms in the subsequent periods. 
 
5.  Baseline estimation results 
Table 3 indicates the results of our multinomial logistic regression.  The data set 
covers the entire period from 1995 to 2004, except if the data is unavailable.  The 
sampled firms are the zombie firms that were identified on the basis of our criterion 
after eliminating outliers, mentioned in section 2.  By benchmarking against those 
firms that were coded as one, the sign of each coefficient suggests the effectiveness of 
each factor in reviving the zombie firms and moving them to the non-zombie category   
In order to avoid simultaneous biases, we accounted for a one-year lag for all 
explanatory variables.  Table 3 reports two types of specifications, i.e., one without 16 
 
time dummies and one with time dummies but without variables related to external debt 
and equity.  We compute the value of the coefficients as well as marginal effects 
(indicated as “dp/dx” in Table 3) in order to confirm whether or not the latter is 
essentially the same as the former.   
With respect to the degree of corporate restructuring, both the coefficient of “the 
change in employee strength” and “change in value of fixed assets” assumed a 
significantly negative sign.  Reducing the number of employees and selling 
underutilized fixed assets were beneficial in reviving zombie firms.  However, the 
coefficient of “no bonus payment dummy” assumed a negative sign.    This implies that 
providing an incentive to managers rather than penalizing them may be preferable for 
facilitating the recovery of troubled firms. 
“Special losses” and “special profits” also played an important role in the recovery of 
troubled firms.  The coefficient of “special losses” and “special profits” assumed a 
significantly positive and negative sign, respectively.  Until the early 2000s, there was 
a lack of transparency in the Japanese accounting system owing to the historical cost 
principle.  Traditional Japanese firms held substantial unrealized gains in the form of 
prime assets.  Utilizing these gains could increase their final profits arbitrarily.  Once 
the troubled firms increased special profits, it was likely that they had sold off their 
prime assets in order to conceal poor business status and postpone the laborious process 17 
 
of restructuring.  As a result, the recovery of the firms with higher special profits was 
further delayed.  In contrast, when the troubled firms substantially increased their 
special losses, it was likely that they had revealed their previously concealed losses to 
the public.    Therefore, transparency in a firm’s business condition may encourage it to 
accept the laborious process of restructuring more readily, thereby accelerating its 
recovery. 
The coefficient of “debt-asset ratio” was significantly negative.  Firms with surplus 
debt tended to delay their process of recovery.  This suggests that firms with excess 
debt required external financial support for their recovery.  In our estimation results, 
debt relief and capital reduction were useful for reviving the zombie firms.  However, 
the impact of debt relief was not linear since the coefficient of the linear and quadratic 
terms assumed a significantly negative and positive sign, respectively.  The 
non-linearity implied that substantial financial support was necessary for achieving 
sustained recovery. 
The coefficient of the “length of being a zombie” assumed a significantly negative 
sign.  For external financial support to be effective, prompt restructuring of troubled 
firms is preferable.  With respect to the macroeconomic environment, an increase in 
total sales accelerated the recovery of troubled firms.    The time dummies for the 2000s 
were significantly positive.    All of these suggest the importance of improvement in the 18 
 
macroeconomic environment for the recovery of troubled firms. 
 
6. Estimation for sub-periods 
  In the previous section, we investigated the nature of corporate restructuring that was 
effective for the recovery of the zombie firms from 1995 to 2004.  The sample period 
includes both the recession and recovery period of the Japanese economy.  In order to 
investigate the robustness of our baseline estimation results, this section estimates our 
multinomial logistic model by dividing the sample into the following two sub-periods: 
1995 - 2001 and 2001 - 2004.  We divide the sample period prior to and post 2001 
because both the share of zombies and non-performing loan ratios reached their peak in 
2001.  The first (1995 - 2001) and second sub-period (2001 - 2004) roughly 
correspond to the period of the prolonged recessions and economic recovery, 
respectively. 
  We estimated the multinomial logistic model by employing the unbalanced panel 
data for the two sub-sample periods.  In order to avoid simultaneous biases, we 
assumed a one-year lag for all explanatory variables.    Tables 4(1) and 4(2) summarize 
the estimation results for the first and second sub-periods, respectively.  By 
benchmarking against the firms that were coded as one, the sign of each coefficient 
suggested the effectiveness of each factor in facilitating the recovery of zombie firms.  19 
 
All coefficients assumed the same signs as those in the previous section for both the 
periods.    This implies that our basic results hold for both the sub-periods. 
However, the estimated coefficients were less significant for the first sub-period 
(1995 - 2001), i.e., during recession in the Japanese economy.  The  “Debt-asset  ratio,” 
“accumulated debt relief,” and “length of being a zombie” continued to remain 
significant.  However, none of the proxy variables for corporate restructuring were 
significant.  Corporate  restructuring without an improved macroeconomic environment 
may have been less effective for the recovery of troubled firms. 
In contrast, a majority of the estimated coefficients were significant during the second 
sub-period (2001 - 2004) when the Japanese economy was recovering.  In particular, 
“the change in employee strength,” “change in the value of fixed assets,” “special 
losses,” and “special profits” had larger marginal effects than those in the previous 
tables.  Reducing the employees’ strength and selling underutilized fixed assets were 
generally beneficial in reviving zombie firms.  However, they usually accompanied 
large amounts of special losses for the firms.  In order to enhance the effectiveness of 
corporate restructuring, a favorable macroeconomic environment may be indispensable 
for the recovery of troubled firms. 
 
7. The impact on profit 20 
 
In the previous sections, we showed that reducing the employee strength and selling 
fixed assets were beneficial for reviving zombie firms.  However, it is still unclear 
whether the effectiveness of corporate restructuring is exclusive for reviving zombie 
firms.  The zombie firms recovered when their profits substantially improved.  It 
would be interesting to investigate whether or not a similar corporate restructuring 
improved the profits of non-zombie firms.  Therefore, this section investigates the 
impact of corporate restructuring on the profits of healthy firms. 
We investigated the effects of corporate restructuring on the profits during period t for 
the firms that were categorized as non-zombie in period t-1.  We use the firms’ ROA 
(return on asset) as an assessment of the profits.  We calculated the ROA by using 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) normalized by total asset value.  Except the 
elimination of the “length of being a zombie,” the OLS regressions were run using the 
same set of explanatory variables as used in the previous sections.  In order to avoid 
simultaneous biases, we assumed a one-year lag for all explanatory variables.   
Table 5 reports the estimation results for the entire sample period and two sub-periods.   
A majority of the explanatory variables were statistically significant.  Except for the 
coefficient of the quadratic term of accumulated debt relief, the signs of all other 
coefficients were stable.  However, contrary to the results of multinomial logistic 
regressions, the coefficients of “the change in employee strength” and “change in the 21 
 
value of fixed assets” assumed significantly positive signs.    Downsizing was not useful 
in improving the profits of healthy firms. 
In general, troubled firms have excess capacity with respect to labor input and capital 
stock.  Therefore, restructuring the excess capacity is indispensable for improving the 
efficiency of such firms.  However, healthy firms do not possess excess capacity.  
Instead, to the extent that their future earnings are promising, they need to increase labor 
input and capital stock in order to enhance their profits.  Corporate restructuring is an 
important prescription only for reviving troubled firms. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
  In this paper, we investigated why zombie firms recovered in Japan in the first half of 
the 2000s.    Extending the method from previous studies, we first identified those firms 
that could be categorized as zombies from among the listed firms.    This permitted us to 
obtain a group of zombie firms, in which the number of firms corresponded with the 
non-performing loan ratios in the first half of the 2000s.  By employing the extended 
series, we performed multinomial logistic regressions in order to investigate the nature 
of corporate restructuring that was effective in reviving zombie firms.   
We found that restructuring including reducing the employee strength and selling 
unutilized fixed assets was effective for the revival of troubled firms.  In addition, 22 
 
increasing special losses aided the recovery of zombie firms as it may have improved 
their accounting transparency.  However, increasing special profits through the sale of 
prime assets was detrimental to the recovery of zombie firms because it may postpone 
the laborious process of restructuring.  Curtailing bonus payments to executives was 
not effective as it may discourage and demotivate them. 
  External supports including debt relief and capital reduction were the other 
important factors for the recovery of zombie firms.  However, we found that 
substantial external supports and not small amounts of debt relief were necessary for 
reviving zombie firms.  In addition, the favorable macroeconomic environment in the 
2000s was played an important role in enhancing the effectiveness of corporate 
restructuring.  The sub-sample estimation result implies that the impact of corporate 
restructuring was insignificant in the absence of a favorable macroeconomic 
environment. 
  Finally, we found that although downsizing capacity was effective in reviving the 
zombie firms, it did not contribute to improving the profits of the non-zombie firms.  
This suggests that desirable prescriptions for the revival of zombie firms, which our 
empirical findings elucidated, are different from those that are required for the growth 
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Data source: Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
Note: 2005 = 100. 27 
 
Figure 2. 










Non-perfoming loan ratio of major banks (left axis)
"Zombie" ratio based on our criterion (left axis)
"Zombie" ratio based on CHK's criterion (right axis)  
 
Notes: 1. Zombie ratio denotes the number of zombie firms from among the sample firms. 
2. The data for non-performing loan ratios has been published by the Financial Services Agency. 
3. Zombie ratio on the basis of CHK’s criterion is not necessarily a perfect replication of the original 
paper since we have used a different data source and our calculations are based on the fiscal year. 28 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of key variables on the basis of the current status of the firms 






























"Zombies"                         
     N u m b e r   o f   observations  1257  1257  1257  1257  1257   1257  
     Mean  -0.057  0.001  0.059  0.023  0.340   -0.043  
     Median  -0.040  -0.013  0.015  0.002  0.320   -0.030  
     Standard  deviation  0.145  0.209  0.181  0.092  0.202   0.159  
     Minimum  value  -2.738  -2.145  0.000  0.000  0.001   -1.152  
     Maximum  value  0.960  2.123  3.103  1.801  1.398   0.775  
"Non-zombies"                         
     N u m b e r   o f   observations  16348  16348  16348  16348  16348   16348  
     Mean  -0.023  0.031  0.029  0.011  0.200   0.007  
     Median  -0.019  0.010  0.009  0.001  0.177   0.009  
     Standard  deviation  0.130  0.176  0.106  0.043  0.163   0.137  
     Minimum  value  -4.830  -3.548  0.000  0.000  0.000   -1.925  
     Maximum  value  2.296  2.101  5.943  2.069  1.422   1.616  
Difference of two-means test (one-sided)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    0.000   
 
Notes: 1. The statuses of the firms have been described for the period 1995 to 2004.  In order to 
avoid simultaneous biases, we assume a one-year lag for all explanatory variables. 
2. After eliminating outliers, all the listed firms in our sample universe have been included, provided 
they were listed over the last three years. 29 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of key variables classified on the basis of the change in the status 






























"Zombies"                         
     N u m b e r   o f   observations  530 530 530 530 530    530 
     Mean  -0.070  -0.025  0.075  0.030  0.390   -0.068 
     Median  -0.052  -0.025  0.022  0.003  0.364   -0.047 
     Standard  deviation  0.118  0.172  0.185  0.123  0.204   0.159 
     Minimum  value  -0.790  -0.916  0.000  0.000  0.005   -1.152 
     Maximum  value  0.405  1.041  1.988  1.801  1.300   0.494 
"Non-zombies"                         
     N u m b e r   o f   observations  730 730 730 730 730    730 
     Mean  -0.083  -0.050  0.090  0.024  0.327   -0.061 
     Median  -0.051  -0.037  0.036  0.003  0.312   -0.037 
     Standard  deviation  0.166  0.258  0.190  0.077  0.203   0.170 
     Minimum  value  -1.769  -3.548  0.000  0.000  0.000   -1.317 
     Maximum  value  0.405  2.101  2.494  0.983  1.422   0.618 
Difference of two-means test (one-sided)  0.057  0.039  0.076  0.131  0.000    0.249 
 
Notes: 1. The statuses of the firms have been described for the period 1995 to 2004.  In order to 
avoid simultaneous biases, we assumed a one-year lag for all explanatory variables. 
2. After eliminating outliers, only the sample firms that were categorized as zombies in the previous 
year, which coincides with the samples of logit estimation, have been included and described. The 
delisted firms were eliminated. 30 
 
Table 3 
Baseline estimation results (Sample period: 1995 - 2004) 
Dependent variable: “continues to be listed as a non-zombie” 
       Model  1                 Model  2             
       Coefficient z-Statistic    dp/dx    Coefficient  z-Statistic     dp/dx
Change in employee strength  -0.746  -1.76  *  -0.182  -0.764    -1.74    *  -0.185 
Change in value of fixed assets  -0.763  -2.43  ** -0.186    -0.577    -1.73    *  -0.140 
No bonus payment dummy  -0.215  -1.59    -0.053  -0.272    -1.97    **  -0.066 
Special  losses   1.736  4.04  ** 0.422  0.811   1.76   *  0.197 
Special profits    -1.527  -2.41  ** -0.371  -0.703   -1.13     -0.170 
Debt-asset  ratio  -1.486  -4.78  ** -0.361  -1.278   -4.04   **  -0.310 
Accumulated debt relief  -7.847  -2.60  ** -1.909       
Accumulated debt relief squared  7.476  1.72  *  1.818       
Capital reduction dummy  1.387  1.89  *  0.268       
The length of being a zombie  -0.153  -3.35  ** -0.037  -0.153    -3.47    **  -0.037 
Change in total sales  0.686  1.83  *  0.167  1.099    2.78    **  0.267 
Dummy of exporting manufacturing  0.206  1.72  *  0.050  0.264    2.19    **  0.064 
Year  dummy1995    0.249   0.90     0.061 
Year  dummy1996    -0.115   -0.39     -0.027 
Year  dummy1998    0.349   1.31     0.082 
Year  dummy1999    0.880   3.19   **  0.194 
Year  dummy2000    0.592   2.08   **  0.135 
Year  dummy2001    0.432   1.61     0.101 
Year  dummy2002    0.715   2.76   **  0.162 
Year  dummy2003    1.162   4.10   **  0.245 
Year  dummy2004    0.692   2.22   **  0.155 
Constant  0.987  6.41  ** 0.420   1.67   * 
                    
Number of observations  1306         1306       
Wald chi-squared  8088.2          38451.1       
Prob＞chi-sq.  0.000         0.000         
Log pseudolikelihood  -1001.3          -982.3         
Pseudo R-squared  0.052                 0.070               
 31 
 
Notes: 1. The estimation results of dependent variable category “continues to be listed as a zombie” 
(coded as one) was not shown to save the space. 
2. * and ** denote significance at .10 and .05 levels, respectively.    The z-Statistics were calculated 
based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (Huber-White estimator). 
3. The year dummy 1997 was eliminated because we did not have a sample for the category 
"delisted" (code three) in 1995 and 1996. 
4. dp/dx denotes the marginal impact of a given independent variable at its sample mean on the 
transition probability.  However, in case of dummy variables, "marginal" represents a discrete 
change from zero to one. 32 
 
Table 4 
Estimation Results for two sub-periods 
(1) Sample period: 1995 - 2001 
Dependent variable: “continues to be listed as a ‘non-zombie’” 
       Model  1                 Model  2             
       Coefficient z-Statistic    dp/dx    Coefficient  z-Statistic     dp/dx
Change in employee strength  -0.077  -0.13    -0.019  -0.019    -0.03      -0.005 
Change in value of fixed assets  -0.447  -1.35    -0.111    -0.391    -1.09      -0.097 
No bonus payment dummy  -0.203  -1.23    -0.051  -0.227    -1.36      -0.057 
Special  losses   1.029  2.06  ** 0.256  0.139   0.29     0.034 
Special profits    -0.717  -0.94    -0.179  -0.008   -0.01     -0.002 
Debt-asset  ratio  -1.425  -3.61  ** -0.355  -1.368   -3.42   **  -0.340 
Accumulated debt relief  -10.128  -1.79  *  -2.522       
Accumulated debt relief squared  11.956  1.47    2.977       
Capital reduction dummy  0.647  0.88    0.153       
The length of being a zombie  -0.181  -3.28  ** -0.045  -0.187    -3.44    **  -0.047 
Change in total sales  0.138  0.28    0.034  0.747    1.36      0.186 
Dummy of exporting manufacturing  0.176  1.21    0.044  0.224    1.53      0.056 
Year  dummy1995    0.210   0.76     0.052 
Year  dummy1996    -0.108   -0.36     -0.027 
Year  dummy1998    0.316   1.17     0.078 
Year  dummy1999    0.877   3.10   **  0.207 
Year  dummy2000    0.633   2.21   **  0.152 
Year  dummy2001    0.464   1.72   *  0.113 
Constant  0.954  4.71  ** 0.595   2.12   ** 
          
Number of observations  862         862     
Wald chi-squared  4712.6          14534.7       
Prob＞chi-sq.  0.000         0.000      
Log pseudolikelihood  -635.8          -626.5       
Pseudo R-squared  0.043                 0.057             
 
Notes: 1. The estimation results of dependent variable category “continues to be listed as a zombie” 33 
 
(coded as one) was not shown to save the space. 
2. * and ** denote significance at .10 and .05 levels, respectively.    The z-Statistics were calculated 
based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (Huber-White estimator). 
3. The year dummy 1997 was eliminated because we did not have a sample in the category 
"delisted" (code three) in 1995 and 1996. 
4. dp/dx denotes the marginal impact of a given independent variable at its sample mean on the 
transition probability.  However, in case of dummy variables, "marginal" represents a discrete 
change from zero to one. 34 
 
Table 4 (continued) 
Estimation Results for two sub-periods 
(2) Sample period: 2001 - 2004 
Dependent variable: “continues to be listed as a non-zombie” 
       Model  1                 Model  2             
       Coefficient z-Statistic    dp/dx    Coefficient z-Statistic     dp/dx
Change in employee strength  -1.230  -1.91  *  -0.275  -1.419    -2.21    **  -0.298 
Change in value of fixed assets  -1.427  -2.57  ** -0.319    -0.969    -1.82    *  -0.184 
No bonus payment dummy  -0.209  -0.99    -0.047  -0.297    -1.39      -0.055 
Special  losses   2.025  2.43  ** 0.452  1.586   1.75   **  0.372 
Special  profits   -3.436  -2.28  ** -0.768  -2.844   -1.83   *  -0.591 
Debt-asset  ratio  -1.115  -2.21  ** -0.249  -1.278   -2.64   **  -0.328 
Accumulated debt relief  -8.437  -2.06  ** -1.885     
Accumulated debt relief squared  7.903  1.18    1.766     
Capital  reduction  dummy  1.575  1.46   0.247    
The length of being a zombie  -0.150  -2.04  ** -0.034  -0.151    -2.29    **  -0.030 
Change in total sales  1.137  2.07  ** 0.254  0.971    1.75    *  0.225 
Dummy of exporting manufacturing  0.213  1.13    0.047  0.245    1.32      0.052 
Year  dummy2002    0.260   1.06     -0.015 
Year  dummy2003    0.714   2.61   **  0.074 
Year  dummy2004    0.246   0.81     -0.019 
Constant  1.036  4.67  ** 0.772   2.83   ** 
        
Number of observations  590         590    
Wald chi-squared  6178.0          58.7       
Prob＞chi-sq.  0.000         0.000      
Log pseudolikelihood  -451.7          -453.3         
Pseudo R-squared  0.070                 0.066               
 
Notes: 1. The estimation results of dependent variable category “continues to be listed as a zombie” 
(coded as one) was not shown to save the space. 35 
 
2. * and ** denote significance at .10 and .05 levels, respectively.    The z-Statistics were calculated 
based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (Huber-White estimator). 
3. dp/dx denotes the marginal impact of a given independent variable at its sample mean on the 
transition probability.  However, in case of dummy variables, "marginal" represents a discrete 




Determinants of profitability of healthy firms 
 
Dependent variable: ROA (Return on asset) 
           Sample  period:  1995-2004       Sample  period:  1995-2001       Sample  period:  2001-2004 
       Coefficient  t-Statistics       Coefficient t-Statistics       Coefficient t-Statistics    
Change in employee strength  0.038    3.79  **   0.053  2.91  **   0.029    2.64  **
Change in value of fixed assets  0.019    2.97  **   0.019  2.65  **   0.018    1.87  * 
No bonus payment dummy  -0.082    -2.70  **   -0.056  -3.85  **   -0.095    -2.30  **
Special  losses   0.061   2.05  **   0.030  1.08      0.085   2.14  **
Special  profits   -0.013   -9.73  **   -0.015  -9.53  **   -0.010   -4.61  **
Debt-asset ratio  -0.091    -17.92  **   -0.084  -16.48 **   -0.110    -12.09 **
Accumulated debt relief  -0.177    -0.82      -0.066  -0.21      -0.292    -1.14   
Accumulated debt relief squared -0.077    -0.22      -0.184  -0.39      0.058    0.14   
Capital  reduction  dummy  0.011   0.62      0.005  0.31      0.032   1.03   
Change in total sales  0.105    14.85  **   0.116  12.92  **   0.099    9.60  **
Dummy of exporting 
manufacturing 
-0.007   -6.79  **   -0.007  -6.47 **   -0.009    -4.69 **
Year  dummy1995  0.008    5.04 **   0.008  5.11 **       
Year  dummy1996  0.008    5.78 **   0.009  5.93 **       
Year  dummy1998  -0.005    -3.00 **   -0.005  -2.85 **       
Year  dummy1999  0.007    3.03 **   0.007  3.45 **       
Year  dummy2000  -0.001    -0.56     -0.001  -0.33         
Year  dummy2001  -0.020    -8.24 **   -0.020  -8.89 **       
Year  dummy2002  0.006   2.74  **       0.026   7.94  **
Year  dummy2003  0.017   6.90  **       0.036   11.30  **
Year  dummy2004  0.015   7.50  **       0.035   12.18  **
Constant  0.051   33.37  **   0.049  31.95  **   0.035   10.93  **
                  
Number of observations  16350        11380      6609       
R-squared 0.180            0.187          0.189        
 
Notes: 1. “ROA” is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the total value 37 
 
of assets. 
2. * and ** denote significance at .10 and .05 levels, respectively.  The t-Statistics were calculated 
based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (Huber-White estimator). 
3. The year dummy 1997 was eliminated for comparison to the results of logistic estimations. 